Synopsis and Analysis of The Chorus

 Synopsis and Analysis of The Chorus (Les Choristes)

 
In 1949, Clément Mathieu, an unemployed music teacher, is hired as a supervisor at a correctional boarding school for minors. Through ineffective and repressive policies, the headmaster, Rachin, struggles to maintain discipline among these troubled students. Mathieu is taken aback by the harsh reality of the school's daily routine, but he begins to spark a change in these children. Through the power and magic of music, the teacher attempts to transform their lives forever.

This film is based on a true story set in the immediate aftermath of World War II (1), where wartime scarcity and economic hardship directly impact life inside the school (2).
I cannot choose any single character in particular because I wouldn't know how to address the central topic around them. There are two—or rather, three—main characters who represent three distinct perspectives found in the social reality of juvenile issues and justice (the headmaster, the teacher, and the youths). However, the secondary characters also represent aspects of this social reality, even if they lack prominence in the film (e.g., absent families, the social reality outside the reformatory, the concern of a relative, the guard's repression, etc.). 

Nor do I identify with any character enough to speak solely about them. I will attempt to discuss the film as a whole rather than focusing on an isolated character. Furthermore, I find the film somewhat slow and a bit boring—one that can be seen as a critique of a system when compared to the reality of reformatories in Argentina and Latin America, albeit a not very "aggressive" critique.

The film relates to criminal law regarding the issue of a minor's situation when facing an offense. From this premise, one can take many paths and connect it to other issues (social problems, abortion, adoption, psychology, recreational activities, alternative dispute resolution methods, etc.).

The situation of the French correctional school can serve as a point of comparison and a basis for criticizing not only one of the stances timidly portrayed in the film, but also the harsh reality faced in underdeveloped countries, perhaps using the idea conveyed through the main character as a better model.

Personally, I believe that France's situation from 1948 onward—as the second largest beneficiary nation of the Marshall Plan in economic terms—had an impact not only on the issue of minors and reformatories, but across all sectors of society and its institutions generally. Suffice it to say that from 1948 to 1952, Europe experienced the period of highest economic growth in its history. To this, we must add the prominent role France played and continues to play in the world following WWII.

It seems to me that the character represented by the director of the correctional institute and the school guard—though primarily the former with his concept of "action-reaction"—alludes to the system prevailing in Argentina and Latin America: the tutelary model (modelo tutelar). The film does not elaborate on details, save for a few phrases that do not say much, but if we pause at the scene where the director strikes a minor, accusing him of stealing money without any evidence incriminating him, we can surmise that he is accusing him based on his situation and background—a clear instance of offender-based criminal law (derecho penal de autor).

The concept of action stems from the theory of the tort/illicit act for which one is subjectively responsible, which can only be conduct and, as such, the conduct of an actor. This indicates that it is futile to ponder the punishability of legal entities, which can never act as individual agents assuming conduct. In our legal system, punishability requires that the individual be the author of an act (act-based criminal law, or derecho penal de hecho). However, in the modern evolution of criminal law, there have been attempts to base punishability on the personal characteristics of the subject without needing to view them as the author of an act (at most, the committed act would be the occasion for imposing punishment, but not its underlying rationale). Under this approach, a "personality" would be punished rather than an act: the thief, rather than the theft (derecho penal de autor).

In offender-based criminal law (derecho penal de autor), conduct is treated merely as a symptom of a personality deemed dangerous to the law, which as such deserves punishment. The legal definition (el tipo) no longer needs to describe the act (the conduct), but rather the individual's personality. While act-based criminal law bases punishability on guilt for the act (culpabilidad de acto)—that is, on the reproach for what was done when a different ("lawful") action could have been taken—in offender-based criminal law, guilt is constituted by the reproach of the "personality": of what the person is, not what they did. Moderate doctrines within this latter trend have emerged, tempering its consequences with requirements belonging to act-based guilt. In our legal framework, offender-based criminal law contradicts liberal criminal law and is unconstitutional (Zaffaroni).

"In general, tutelary criminal policy did not primarily rely on a classic dangerousness-based justification; instead, it used another, far more legitimizing argument: the protection of vulnerable childhood." (3)

In the film, we see no underlying argument, only the application of physical and psychological punishment.

Stratenwerth (4) addresses society's defining power: "It falls upon society to decide, within relatively broad bounds, which behaviors are permitted and which are prohibited (and punishable); this decision, considered appropriate for our level of lawmaking, is generally conscious. In other words, 'criminality' is also the outcome of a social selection process. This society is responsible for attaching the label 'criminal' to certain behaviors. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that Criminal Law produces the crime against which it directs itself." (5)

The film reveals nothing about broader society, save for a mother's visit. We cannot discern the origin of the minors' delinquency; we do not know why these specific youths ended up there instead of others, how they arrived, or what they did. It provides no parameters to understand their social background or condition, among other aspects. Showing this would have offered insight into criminality and the selectivity of the French penal system.

The tutelary model coincided for much of its tenure with the Welfare State model in the United States and Latin America.

Beloff notes: "The determinism between poverty, marginalization, and delinquency is present in all tutelary laws, practices, and institutions (the famous binomial 'abandoned minor/delinquent'). It is the personal conditions of the individual that empower the State to intervene." (6) "In populist States—such as certain Latin American nations in the 1950s—the 'protection' of childhood translated into welfare policies funneled through universal social initiatives." (7) "The tutelary conception briefly outlined above entered a crisis during the 1960s in the US and during the 1980s at the international community level." (8)

I mention the above because the film presents, in a rebellious way, the idea of an alternative to that system—here, undertaken by the teacher through music and tolerance rather than repression. Perhaps it represents an early spark of what would later become the comprehensive protection system that grew first in the US and subsequently in other countries.

The protection of the "best interests of the child" translates into seeking the maximum fulfillment of their specific rights, recognizing the minor as a full legal subject. In this sense, it has been noted that "comprehensive protection means the protection of rights, and the best interest of the child means the satisfaction of those rights" (Beloff).

Minors must be granted all the procedural guarantees enjoyed by adults accused of committing a criminal offense. Additionally, beyond recognizing these standard guarantees, other safeguards stemming from their status as minors must be extended to them (9).

According to Ibáñez (10), democratic criminal law operates on a dual front: it seeks to respond to criminal violence with rationality and balance, and in doing so, attempts to prevent informal reactions.

The tutelary model coincided for much of its duration with the Welfare State model in the US and Latin America.

A similar dynamic occurred in France through the model represented by the school's director; however, the early emergence of an alternative—if not a full systemic overhaul of juvenile justice, at least an educational/rehabilitative alternative—marked a significant milestone. France is a country that, in my view, has historically been at the forefront of social change relative to other nations, for instance regarding adoption and abortion.
To illustrate the complications that differences in adoption legal frameworks pose (or posed) across countries, consider simple versus full adoption. In France, what was termed adopción simple (simple adoption) had for many years granted inheritance rights relative to the adoptive family (11). Furthermore, to protect anonymity, records containing the minor's and biological family's details were sealed in an envelope (I do not recall the exact procedure nor could I find it online, but I read about the changes brought on by advancements in genetics and new trends toward data protection, privacy rights, and professional secrecy, with special handling regarding automated medical databases) (12). All of this began with legislative amendments starting in the second half of the 1990s.

There is also a parallel with the topic of abortion in France, primarily because it was debated around 1975, whereas in Argentina, cases only began emerging slowly around 2007, still generating societal pushback even to the debate itself, causing further delay.
In France, the legal grounds for voluntary termination of pregnancy were codified in the so-called "Veil Law" of January 17, 1975, which was revised in 1982 to allow Social Security reimbursement of expenses. In 1993, faced with the growth of anti-abortion activist groups, the "Neiertz Law" was passed, establishing penalties of up to two years' imprisonment for those who threaten, intimidate, or assault medical personnel performing abortions. Abortion in France can only be performed in authorized public or private hospitals. The woman, who must explicitly authorize the procedure, must demonstrate that the pregnancy causes her distress and anguish. Unmarried minors must present written authorization from their parents (13). France was among the first European nations to legalize voluntary termination of pregnancy (IVG). The 1975 IVG law, supplemented in 1979 and still in force, does not require a pregnant woman to meet special conditions to obtain an abortion, provided it takes place within 12 weeks of amenorrhea. Beyond that timeframe, the law allows termination only on therapeutic grounds when the mother's health is at risk. Social Security reimburses 80% of the expenses for a legal abortion.

Returning to the film and the simplicity of music and the choir formed by the teacher: it served as a way to keep the youths occupied and train them in an activity away from the violence they already experienced, as well as the systemic violence characteristic of reformatories—an approach that works and is sought after (at least in the movie, it proves successful). I say "sought after" drawing a parallel with the Argentine context, no longer inside juvenile detention centers (often colloquially called "deformatories"), but in low-income neighborhoods and informal settlements (villas de emergencia). There, social workers seek alternatives such as sports (football) to keep young people engaged in healthy physical efforts, steering them away from crime and risk factors like drugs.

In conclusion, I see in the film's depiction of the choir and the development of the youths a manifestation of restorative justice as a response to both retributive and rehabilitative justice.
Skeptical views on custodial sentences caused a crisis in juvenile criminal justice in the United States, leading to a rise in neoclassicism and a return to retributivist ideas and negative general prevention. This resulted in a hardening of Criminal Law, including Juvenile Criminal Law. Consequently, a trend emerged in the US toward trying juveniles as adults, serving sentences alongside adults, and even applying the death penalty to minors.

Simultaneously, however, skepticism regarding imprisonment led to the rise of restorative justice ideas in the United States, emerging as a framework opposed to traditional criminal justice, which is arguably rooted in retributive principles. Thus, restorative justice has been conceived as a new paradigm to be distinguished from rehabilitative justice (linked to treatment ideology) as well as retributive justice. From this perspective, one can analyze how traditional criminal justice characterizes the imposition of punishment. It must be noted that restorative justice arose as part of what in North America was termed the "crisis of juvenile criminal justice," driven by the surge in retributive ideas regarding juvenile delinquency and skepticism toward rehabilitative models that had previously enjoyed strong support in Juvenile Law (14).

This is why proceedings involving minors should lack unnecessary complexity, aligning with the concept of comprehensive protection. The child is recognized as a full legal subject (4), yet "there is something paradoxical about this situation, as indirectly noted by Cunningham (Children & Childhood in Western Society Since 1500, Longman, 1995), Postman (The Disappearance of Childhood, Vintage, 1994), and Jenks (Childhood, Routledge, London, 1996): the era of children's rights as citizenship rights—which conceptually brings children closer to adults—conspires against the child's right to be a child, which maintains children in a conceptual dimension clearly distinct from adults." (5)
 

Citations / References
1.    http://www.familia.cl/ContenedorTmp/Coristas/coristas.htm
2.    http://www.familia.cl/ContenedorTmp/Coristas/coristas.htm
3.    Beloff, Mary. "Un Modelo para armar y otro para desarmar: protección integral de derechos del niño vs. derechos en situación irregular", in Los derechos del niño en el Sistema Interamericano, Buenos Aires, 2004, p. 22.
4.    Stratenwerth, Günter. Derecho Penal, Parte General I, Fabián J. Di Plácido Editor, Buenos Aires, 1999.
5.    Stratenwerth, Günter. Derecho Penal, Parte General I, Fabián J. Di Plácido Editor, Buenos Aires, 1999, pp. 7–8.
6.    Beloff, Mary. "Un Modelo para armar y otro para desarmar: protección integral de derechos del niño vs. derechos en situación irregular", in Los derechos del niño en el Sistema Interamericano, Buenos Aires, 2004, p. 21.
7.    Beloff, Mary. "Un Modelo para armar y otro para desarmar: protección integral de derechos del niño vs. derechos en situación irregular", in Los derechos del niño en el Sistema Interamericano, Buenos Aires, 2004, p. 44.
8.    Beloff, Mary. "Un Modelo para armar y otro para desarmar: protección integral de derechos del niño vs. derechos en situación irregular", in Los derechos del niño en el Sistema Interamericano, Buenos Aires, 2004, p. 31.
9.    Palomba, Federico. "Tendencias evolutivas en la protección de los menores de edad", in La niñez y la adolescencia en conflicto con la ley penal, San Salvador, 1995, p. 22.
10.    Ibáñez, Perfecto Andrés. "El Proceso Penal con Menores".
11.    http://www.salvador.edu.ar/ua1-4-menorms.htm
12.    http://www.gracielamedina.com/archivos/derecho/pdf/000005.pdf
13.    http://www.saludcolombia.com/actual/salud38/noveda38.htm
14.    http://www.pensamientopenal.com.ar/32llobet.doc
 

Originally published on 09-28-2007.